Strategic Security Spending

Mr. Hoffman begins his discussion on strategic security spending by referring to a November 2007 speech by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at Kansas State University in which Secretary Gates urged his audience not to expect or demand a peace dividend at the conclusion of the current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Mr. Hoffman agrees with this remark and goes on to mention that both Secretary Gates and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, Admiral Michael Mullen, believe the U.S. government should set a floor for defense spending of 4% of America's GDP. Mr. Hoffman is not questioning the feasibility of establishing a floor for defense spending, or even this specific amount, but he does question how the Defense Department plans to spend this money and whether or not it is a good idea to give this fairly sizable amount to the Pentagon alone, since we have other institutions and programs, such as Homeland Security, the Department of State, education, infrastructure, and basic research, which all are, or can be, tools for American security.

As Mr. Hoffman states, “We cannot have an intelligent debate on defense spending without looking at all our national security requirements” (para. 10), and to do so requires coming to grips with defense spending myths. For example, the U.S. military has not been shortchanged for years; America is not spending less than during the Cold War, and we are not spending less than we have spent historically. In fact, defense spending today is approximately 33% higher than it was during the Cold War. From another perspective, U.S. military spending today is equal to that of the next 24 countries combined in the world, and few of these countries represent potential adversaries. Mr. Hoffman points out that the nature of war has changed from the Cold War era to today's Global War on Terrorism, which he refers to as the Long War. This Long War requires a different type of military, not necessarily a larger one, and it requires a different “strategic calculus and operational capabilities” (para. 14). Additionally, considering the future costs of Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, defense spending requires sustained national strategic planning.

The lack of such serious strategic planning is at the heart of Mr. Hoffman's concern. He finds most, if not all, government agencies fixated on short-term objectives, without the capability to think strategically. Since the spending “pie” in question is for defense, what other agencies contribute to our nation's defense that fall outside the Pentagon? Obviously, Homeland Security and the State Department, yet the money each receives pales in comparison to that of the Defense Department, with the State Department receiving only $1 for every $16 the Pentagon receives. Our government needs to think strategically, make the necessary choices and tradeoffs, and rigorously evaluate the risks.

IRAN, RUSSIA, AND THE BOMB

Assessing the latest National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Rens Lee described the document’s benign view of Iran’s nuclear capabilities as “probably unwarranted” when it concluded “with moderate to high confidence” that Iran has neither a nuclear weapon nor the fissile material to create one. After questioning the NIE statement that “Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003,” he commented at length on Iran’s black market activity, the interdiction of four different smuggling operations that involved attempts to secure highly enriched uranium, the proliferation relationship between Iran and the former USSR, and the counter-proliferation work of the Materials Protection Control and Accounting Program. Lee noted with concern the “few hundred radiation monitors deployed along Russia’s 12,500 mile border” and pointed out that only one-third of the program's planned stations had been established by the turn of the century. Further strengthening his challenge to the NIE, Lee referred to the puzzling 2002 comments of General Yory Baluyevsky — now chief of the Russian general staff — that as of that date Iran already had non-strategic nuclear weapons. Some 22 months later, General Baluyuvsky reversed his position, claiming Iran could not develop nuclear weapons “in the near or distant future.”

From those facts, Lee concluded that U.S. policymakers should not disregard Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons, even the non-strategic variety, since such a weapon could be delivered to any of several terrorist organizations. He consequently stressed the importance of American efforts to isolate and undermine Iran’s current government: increasing economic sanctions; tightening the hold on Iran’s finances; and providing support to Iranian opposition groups.

Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Mike McConnell, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee (www.armed-services.senate.gov) on February 29, repeated what he had told Chris Wallace of Fox News (www.foxnews.com) on February 17: The NIE failed to make clear that the "halt" of Iran’s nuclear weapons program concerned only the third of its three elements: obtaining sufficient fissile material; creating a delivery system; and designing a warhead. Even if not presently designing a warhead, Iran remains engaged in obtaining fissile material and developing long-range missile delivery systems. The easiest part of the program, according to the DNI, is warhead design.
McConnell went on to say that the U.S. intelligence community estimates that Iran will have nuclear weapons within the next two to seven years, the “best guess” being 2013. It appears that Rens Lee has good reason for his concerns.This article brings a new perspective to public diplomacy, international business, and their interaction. Read it in conjunction with Defense Secretary Gates' call for a boost in "soft power":